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The establishment of fonnal agricultural credit  lack of competition and limited accountability-
systems in most developing countries in recent  has led to bad loans, inefficient operations,
decades has been motivated by the belief that  patronage, and irregularities.
widespread shortages of short- and long-terrn
finance have arrested agricultural growth and  Arrangements such as lending groups and
development. The lack of affordable formal  credit cooperatives could rcducc both transaction
credit has been blamed for delaying, if not  costs and the risks involved in lending to small
preventing, the timely adoption of new produc-  farners.  Successful group lending programs
tion technology and intensive nonlabor inputs.  have shown the importance of such factors as
homogeneous borrowing groups that are jointly
Commercial lending institutions generally  liable and themselves assume some of the
focus on large-scale farmers and ignore small-  managerial and supervisory responsibilities.
scale farners  because of the significant cost of  Fact,,s  attributed to the success of credit coop-
processing and servicing unsecured small loans  eratives include bottom-up institutional develop-
and the prevalent belief that small entrepreneurs  ment, extensive training at all levels, reliance on
represent a greater risk than large ones. The  mobilized savings and equity contributions
shortage of strong formal credit markets has  rather than extemal funds, prudent expansion of
caused informal credit institutions to flourish in  cooperative activities, strict monitoring and
many developing countries. These infonnal  auditing, and adequate incentives to staff and
institutions disburse funds rapidly, and the  clients.
transaction costs for borrowers are low.
For a rural financial institution to become
Many specialized agricultural credit institu-  viable, state or donor support should focus on
tions have suffered from design deficiencies.  institution-building and development. Targeted
They often were not expected to function as true  credit without institution-building is almost
financial intenmediaries that mobilize deposits to  always a recipe for prolonged dependenec on
make loans. Instead, they have merely channeled  donor or state funds and bailouts. Attention to
government-supplied funds to rural borrowers.  institution-building often makes the difference
Making external funds continuously available at  between a rural financial institution that can be
below-market interest rates has not obliged rural  self-sustaining after a few years of support
financial institutions to operate under constraints  during its startup period and one that continues
of financial viability. That -ogether  with the  to depend on public support.
ThePolicy RescarchWorking PaperScriesdisseniinatcs the findingsof work undcr way in the Bank. Anobjectivcof  thcscries
is to get thcsc findings out quickly, cven if prcsentations are Icss than fully polished. The findings, interpretations, and
conclusiorns  in thesc papers do not necessarily reprc.;cnt ofrficial  Bank policy.
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Chapter  1:  Backoround
1.  The establishment  of  formal  agricultural  credit  systems  In most developIng  countries  over
the  recent  decades  was motivated  by the  belief  that  widespread  shortages  o  short  and long
terms  finance  constituted  a constralnt  which arrested  agricultural  growth  and development.  The
absonce  of  what was perceived  as affordable  formal  credit  was also blamed for  delaying,  If not
preventing,  a tknely adoptlon  of  now productlon  tochnologls  and the  disseminatlo'  of  non-labor
Intensive  Inputs  such  as  fertilizer,  thereby  slowing down the  growth  and development  of  the
agricultural  sector.  The "Infant  Industry"  argument was frequently  raised  to  support
Interventlon  In financial  markets  In favor  of  the  sector  as a whole or  In support  of  specific
seagmnts of  It  (small-scale  farmers,  promotion  of  new technologies  such  as line of  credit  to
finance  shallow tubowells,  etc.).
2.  The "second  best"  argument.  The emergence and proliferation  of  distorted  sconomic
policies  affecting  the  agriculture  and rural  sectors  providad  pro-interventlonists  wlth additlonal
arguments  favoring  Interventions  by states  In financlal  markets  so  as  to  compensate  the
agricultural  sector  for  the  distorted,  urban-biased  macro-policles  (over-valued  rate  of
exchange,  price  control  on  agricultural  products,  and overprotection  of  domestic  Industrial
Inputs  which were  used as  agricultural  Inputs).  Many donors  Initiated  and supported  channeling2
concessional credit  to agricultural credit programs,  based on the "second best"  argument,  i.e.
mitigating the Impact  of  "urban -biased"  pollcies.  Governments  In developing  countrias  have
Intervened heavlly In rural financlal markets, alming  at  supplying  affordable credit  to small-scale
farmers and rural entrepreneurs, who were percelved as a clientele with no alternative access to
formal credit markets.  A perceived Imperfectlon In rural financlal markets that generated a
discrepancy between social and private costs  and benefits has provided a Justification for
Intervention In rural credit markets.  As private returns  were estimated to be below the social
ones, the Intervention was Intended to overcome tiils failure and to spur Investments  that would
not have materialized  otherwise.
3.  The perceived imperfectlons In rural credit markets stem from the characterlstics of
agricultural production systems.  Agricultural Income  Is Influenced markedly  by climatic conditlons,
which  expose the rural population to  h!gher  risks than those provailing In other sectors.  In
addition, crops may often  be subject to drastic  price changes, causing further  variability In
farmers' Income  and the relat,  r'.payment capacity.  These risks  are typically hlghly correlated
across wide segmients  of  the i.  ming  community. Lending In rural areas often  Implies  servicing a
geographically  dispersed clientele, which  entails hlgh transaction costs.  In many  developing
countrlos, the weak legal system and the Ineffective  reinforcement arrangements have
contributed  to the reluctance of  commerclal  banks to engage In lending to the rural population.
Related to  this Issue Is the frequent lack of  secure land tenure, leading  to  the absence of
collateral or reduced foreclosure  capability.3
4.  When  commercial  lending institutions have been active In rural areas, they, In most
Instances, have focused on large-scale farmers while small-scale farmers have been Ignored, due
to the significant lending  cost  Ir. processing and servicing unsecured small  loans.  The prevalent,
though often  unjustifled,  belief that  small  entreprenevlrs constitute  a hlgher risk  than large ones
has encouraged caterlng to large borrowers.  In the absence oY strong formal credit markets,
Informal  credit markets have flourlshed In many  develoDing  countrle-s. These Informal  markets are
characterized by low transaction costs  for  the borrower and rapid disbursement  of  funds.
These features  can be attributed  to  close familiarity with the borrower's creditworthiness that,
combined  with efficlent  loan collection mechanisms,  made  the Informal credit market, often  either
the exc asive or the preferred  source of  credit In rural areas In spite of  high Interest charges.
Most of  the Informal  lenders, however, were limited  In the term diversification of  the loan
portfolio,  and operated within limited  geographical areas.
h.  The Intervention was vlewed  as justified  also on equity grounds - moneylenders'  short
term, high cost  financkltg  was considered an Impediment  to  growth and equity objectives.  The
social cost of  Intervening In financial markets was perceived to be minor.  Three basic forms of
Intervention In the rural credit market have prevailed:  (I) the administrative allocatlon of  'Ands
to  agricultural activitlis  and rural areas, (11)  an Imposed  Interest  rate ceiling, and (111)  the
estabilshment  of  and regular support  for speclalized  agricultural credit institutlons  (SACI)  so as
to cover their regular deficits.  These Interventlons attempted to Influence the amount  lent In
rural areas and the price of  loanable  funds as well as to control the Institutlonal development
and mode  of  operatlons of  the SACIs  Involved.4
C.  Performance. By and large, past performance of  the state-  and donor-supported
agricultural credit  operations has been below expectatlons.  Most of  the programs  reached only a
minority o? the faming  population, while benefits were frequently concentrated  among  wealthIer
farmers.  Many  of  the irstitutlons  established or supported for  dolivering credit programs  have
not developed Into self-sustalning  credit faciltles.  Furthermore, In many Instances, the subsidy
dependence  of  these institutlons  has become  significant and has been rilsing. This, In turn, made
credit programs  an extremely costly affair  for  their sponsorlng governments. For example,  the
agricultural credit systems of  the World  Bank's three most knportant  agricultural credit borrowers
In the eighties, Brazil, Mexico,  and India,  have all suffered  from severe equlty erosion.  In Brazil
and Mexico,  highly negative Interest  rates  In an Inflationary environment  generated the erosion,
whilo In India the equity erosion resulted from dlsnal loan collectlon. 1 In the agracultura!  credit
systems of  Brazil, Mexico,  and India, administrative interventions retarded the development  of
efficient  financial markets and had negative knplicatlons for  other sectors  In the economy  by
depriving them  of  loanable funds and Increasing thelr borrowing costs.
7.  As an OED  study of  agricultural credit projects  In 24 countries points out,  these
projects  have often  failed to become  vehicles to upgrade farm technology. 2 The programs
reached a minority of  the farming population and benefits were frequently  concentrated among
wealthier farmers.  For example,  a study In Ccsta Rlca  has shown  that  Income  distrlbutlon could be
J.  Yaron  and  P. iegel, Sank  *Lnding  for  Agricull  Credlt FYM2M88  Agrulfture  and  Ruwa  Developmt Departrert,
Decembe  1968.
2 Documnt  JAC  8845  of th Jont Audit  Caommitt"e.  Aproach  Far:  A Review  of Bank  Lendhg  for  Agricultural  Credit
(1961-1987)  dated  October  S. 196P  - 3.  pam  6. The  edy  oovered  Oh period  beor  1976.6
significantly Improved  If credit subsld;es  wore ollminated. 3 Many  of  the institutions  established or
supported for  dol earing credit programs did not develop Into self-sustalned  credit facliitles 4
8.  The disappoInting  performance  of  the credit supply-led approach can be attributed  to
two sets of  Issues: (1)  some  of  the underlying premises  of  this approach were frequently  not
valid, and (11)  the Institutlons  and arrangements  established or utilized for  kmplementing  the policy
were often  dosigned and operated In an Inviable  manner,  or within a policy and social environment
hindering thelr effectiveness.
Chapter 2:  Issues Related  to  Supply-led Credit Approach
9.  Perceived zhortage  of  credit  In many Instances, It Is not clear that rural areas are
slgnificantly constralned by a shortage of  funds.  Furthermore, In areas where effective  Interest
rates  are kept low through subsidles or celilngs, demand  tends to exceed supply and an artificlal
sense of  shortage of  credit prevalils. Recent surveys In China  and Thalland  Indicated that  both
among  borrowing and non-borrowing farmers (mostly smaliholders),  only a minority had an
unsatisfled dermaand  for  formal liquidity.6 Most farmers have access to  the more flexible services
provided by Informal  lenders.  It Is commonly  claimed  that Informal  lenders charge very high
Interest  rates  due to  their monopoly  position, and are therefore  not socially desirable.  This view
3~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
3R.  Vog  'The  Effct of Subsidizd  Agrcutr  Credit  on ncome  Diibution in Costs  Rica',  In  Adans  et  al.  Underminina
Rural  DevCoomwd  wHh  Ch.aa  Credit,  Welw  Prm, 1984.
4 Document  JAC  88-35  of  toe  Joint  Audit  CommMit,  October  5, 1988.
5 Feder  at  al.  'Agricultural  Credit  and  Farm  Peformance  In  Chins',  J. of  Comaarative  Economics,  December  1989  and
unpubsd  data  from  Woird  Bank  sty  RPO  8733  'Land  Title  Security  and  Farm  Producivity  tn  Thaiand'.B
Is not  necessarily  warranted.  For  example, studles  In India, Malayela, and the  PhIlippines show
that  there  Is a significant  lev'il  of  competition  In Informal  markets  and relatively  llttle  monopoly.
In the  PhilIppInes, monopoly profits  amounted to  loss  than  4 percent  of  the  total  sum lont.6 In
many Instances,  the  hlgh rates  of  Interest  charged  by  Informal lnders  reflect  primarily the  hlgh
costs  and risks  Involved  In lending to  small farmers,  although  cases  of  exploitation  exist.
10.  The general  validity  of  the  promiso that  credit  shortages  Inhib5t adoption  of  new
technology  Is questionable  because  many Inputs  and tochnologles  are divisiblo  and can  be
adopted  In a gradual  manner, so  little  capital  Is needed Initlally.  Poor marketing  networks,  Input
supplies  and distorted  product  prices  are often  more crucial  constralnts  on  technology  adoption
than lack  of  credit.  Unless the  new technology  reQuires  substantlal  up-front  outlays,  wlth
returns  spread  over  tknu, It Is not  obvious  that  credit  Is the  best  mechanism to  encourage
adoptlon  of  now technoblos.  Studles  indicate  that  even  small farmers  have a signlficant
savings  potential,  and are  capable  of  mobilizing resources  when profitable  opportunitles  for
Investment  exist. 7 This potential  justifles  institutlon  building to  facilitate  Intermediatlon,  but  not
necessarily  Infusion  of  external  funds.  Rather,  a large  Inflow  of  external  funds,  especially  when
made avallable at  subsidized rates,  suppresses  both  savings  and the  growth  of  viable  commercial
6lHarrf,  'Monmy  and  Commodie:  Their  Interaction  In  a Rural  Indian  Setng', In  von  Plschke  et  al.,  Rural  Financial  Market
In  DevOlno Countre.  Johns  Hopkins  Uniesit  Pre", 1963.
K Slnh, *Strc  ot Intr  Ras  on Consumpdon  Loans  In  an Indian  Vllage'  In  von  Plshke  et  al.,  cited  above,  1983.
R.J.G.  Web,  -An Input  Credit  Progrm  for  Small  Famer In  Wet Mla^y'  In  von  Piechke  et at. dt  above,  1983.
Technical  Board  of  Agricultural  Credit  'A Study  on te Informal  Rural  FInnci  Markts', Manila,  1981.
7See  for  example,  'Review  of Rural  Fian  Seices in  Sub-aharan  Africa',  Agriculture  Division  of  Africa  Technical
Cepartment,  1889  or A.  Wgue, Mobiliation  of rura  savings  in developing  countris: the  case  of  Mai', Ph.D.  Dissertaton,
Univery  of Cincimati.  1988;  or C. Cuvas. 'Saving and  Loan Cooperative  In  Rural  Areas  of  Developing  Counties,  Roent
Peifomance  and  Potential',  in &avinas  and  Deoent  No.  1.188.7
Inst!tutions.  The perceived failure of  credit markets to urovide funding for  worthy agricultural
activitles  can often  be traced to  Inadequate  public Investment  In legal and phy8lcal
lrarastructure,  enforcement mechanisms,  and  commodity  risk mitlgating arrangemente  which  would
make  lending to  agriculture a more profitable undertaking.
11.  Fungibility  of  money  The effectiveness  of  attempts to address 'he Inadequacy  of
market-Induced Institutional credit to  agriculture through governme-At  Intervention Is often
hindered by the fungiblilty of  money. In many  Instances, unless costly supervislon Is undertaken,
borrowers can use funds for  purposes preferable to them,  regardless of  the cbJectlves
promoted by policy makers. Furthermore, It Is Impossible  to  ensure that borrowed funds are used
to  finance more Investment than would have taken place otherwise, with funding from other
sources.  Additional loan funds may thus generate otGy  a partial iri:rc  ie  In Investment,
especlally If the profitabillIty of  agriculture Is low and farmers have other, more attractive
Investment  or consumption  opportunities.  Two OED  studies on the offect  of  agricultural credit
found tlhat substitutlon  of  funds was a major factor  responsible for  the limited success of
credit In enhancing  productivity.8 For example,  of  the funds provided through Bank-supcorted
credit projects  In Mexico,  Pakistan, and the Phillppines,  only 25-50  percent were estimated to
have added to  agricultural Investment. The common  argument  that subsidized credit should
compensate  farmers for  other policlis which  penalize agriculture (e.g., price controls,  overvalued
exchange  rates  and commodity  export taxes) Is frequently not valid, because the subsidy does
8 OED,  'Kenya,  Impact  Evaluafon  Report First  SmalJholder  Agriculural  Credit  ProJect",  Report  No.  2968,  May  5, 1980;
OED,  *Agrkulural  Credit  Progmams,  Report  No.  1357,1976  (A  otudy  of  24 cowntries).not  change  the  profitability  of  the  agricultural  activities  adversely  affected  and Invariably
accrues  largely  as a  windfall  to  the  loss  needy  beneflcarles.  Even If  divei'sion  of  funds  Is
effe&tively  controlled,  the  reciplents  of  the  funds  are,  In most  Instances,  only  a small proportion
of  the  farming  populatlon,  and thu2  the  distortion  In resource  allocation  Is not  slgnlifcantly
rectifled.
Chapter  3:  Issues  Related t'i  Crodlt  Delivery  System
12.  Lack  of  savincs  mobilizatlon  and miisguided performance  criteria.  Many specialized
agricultural  credit  institutions  have suffered  from  deficiancies  Inherent  In their  design.  They
frequently  were not  expected  to  function  as true  financial  intermedlarles  which mobiilzo deposits
to  make loans.  Instead,  these  Institutions  have merely channeled  government  supplied  funds  to
rural  borrowers.  The continuous  avallability  of  external  funds  at  below-market  Interest  rates
has not  obilged  rural  financial  Institutions  to  operate  under  financlal  viability  constralnts.
Together  with the  lack of  competitlon  and limited accountability,  this  has led to  bad  loans,
extremely  Inefficient  operations,  patronage  and Irreguluritles.  A report  prepared  for  the  World
Bank by  local experts  In India states  that  "During the  election  years  there  Is considerable
propaganda  from  polltlcal  platforms  for  postponement  of  Ioan recovery  or  prossure  on  the  credit
Institutions  to  grant  extest  jns  to  avold  or  delay  the  onforcement  process  of  recovery.  The
willful defaulters  are  In general  socially  and politically  Inportant  people  whose example others  are
likely to  follow."  It Is therefore  not  surprlsing  that  arrears  of  about  50 percent  have plaguedthis system. F  thermore, the above cited report observes that  "the general climate in rural
areas Is becoming  Increasingly hostile to  rocoverles."
13.  Because their operations were not driven by commercial  financial performance criterla,
lending institutions have lacked the inceintives  to make strong collection efforts.  Rather, the
performance Incentives of  specialized  agricultural credit Institutions have often  been based on
quick loan approval and disbursement  and rapid growth In the lending  volume,  facilitated  by
rapidly expanding  ext(o  al funding from donors.  Doeticlent  fInancial reporting practices have made
It difficult  to  determine  when  and which  payments  are overdue.  Typically, data presented on
arrears (when they are available at all) only allow for  a partlal analysis of  the loan portfolio.
This underestimates the severity of  the arrears problem  when  the portfollo  grows rapidly In
nominal  terms (high Inflationary economies)  and the loan portfolio  consists of  substantlal long-
term loans or grace periods are granted.  Among  important Bank cllents, Bra1ll,  Mexico,  and
Yugoslavia all used stock measures  of  loan arrears, despite the fact  that they were all plagued
by hlgh InflaIon.  This resulted In a misleading  picture of  the quallty of  the loan portfolio. 9
Proper provisions for  bad debts were not made  and an adequate assessment  of  the institutlon's
viability was often  impossible. Thl  deficiency has been widespread,  as reflected  by the fact  that
only one-third  of  24 Bank appraisal reports  for  agricultural credit projects  which  were reviewed
by AGR  for  the period 1982-88 reported on annual collection ratlos and six provided no
nformation on arrears.
9  j.  Yaron  and  P.  SIO,  Sank  Landing  f6r  AgrCultura  Credit FYS2-88,  Agricultu and  Rural  ODelopnDepamet
Deoembr  1988.10
14.  As a  result, financlal data often  present rosy  scenarios wnieo  In absence of  adequate
provisions for  loan losses, the SACIs'  financial statements are likely to mislead  the analyst.  The
overall cost of  maintalning  the SACI  afloat  Is almost  never presented.  Many  of  the subsidies
Involved In SACIs' operations, such as concessional financial resources that were made  available
by the Central Bank, or state  repayment  of  forolgn exchange losses on strong  currency
denominated  loans, are not  adequately captured In the SACIs'  fInancial statements when  the Issue
Is the overall financial cost of  malntaining  the SACI  afloat.  Deficlent fInancial reporting has
contrlbuted to  lack of  clarity on the SACls  cost  side.  In many  Instances, the subsidles that
benefitted  the SACis  were not transparent,  not funded from the budget, so as to allow a public
debate on their costs,  benefits  and social desirability.
15.  Specialized  Agricultural Credit Institutions which  depend almost exclusively on external
funds have to  follow goverrdnent  directives when  allocating thelr funds.  As these directives
frequently  Include administrative allocation of  funds to  certain target  groups And exclusive
lending for  agriculture, the financial Intermediarles  have limited ability to diverslfy  their loan
portfolio,  to  use creditworthinoss criteria, and to Implement  adequate risk management  policy.
18.  High  lending and borrowing costs.  In their attempt to  ensur  ellgibillty and avold diverslon
of  funds, specialized formal Institutions  Incur high costs  and also kmpose high transactlon costs
on borrowers.  Typically, farmers are obliged to  spend slgnificant amounts  of  both money  and
tkne to obtain loans *ron  specialized  Institutions.  In fact,  small  borrowers' transactlon costs  are
often  so hlgh tnat  the effective  cost of  a loan (including transaction costs  and Interest11
payments)  obtained In the formal market exceeds that  of a loan from the Informral  market.  A
study in Bangladesh,  for  example,  has shown  that  the average effective  cost of  a loan smaller
than 1000 Takas varied between 146 percent and 169 percent In the formal market, while It
varled from 57 percent to  86 percent In the Infomal market. 10 Only for  loans above this
amount  were effective  loan costs  cheaper for credit from formal markets.  Another study In
Bolivla  showed that  transaction costs  which  borrowers had to  Incur before they even knew
whether their  loan would ever be approved amounted  to over  18 percent of  the amount  applied
for.11 The same  costs  amounted  to  slightly over 8 percent In the Informal  market.  A cross-
sectlonal study found that transaction costs  as a percentage of  officlal  Interest  rates  could be
as high as 245 percent (Bangladesh)  II r small  loans, while  It was between 3 percent and 56
percent  for  large loans.12 The hlgh borrower transactlon costs  for  small  loans obtalned from
official  lenders explain  why small  farmers who require modest loans may  avold using the formal
market.
17.  The effect  of  controls on Interest rates.  Officlal ceilings on onlnding  Interest  rates
have frequently  forced  lending at rates which  do not  cover transactlon and risk costs.  For
example,  the typical spreads of  3 to  6 percent do not provlde for  full cost  recovery when
lenders' administrative costs  for  small  or medlum  sized loans can reach up to 20 percent of  the
sum  lent.  Even specialized  rural financlal Institutions with a good loan portfolio  and excellent
10Z  Ahmed,  'Efhfeove  coot  of rural  loan In  Bangladsh',  World  Development,  17.3,  1989.
1 J. Ladman,  'Loan Transactions  Costs,  Credi Ratoning  and  Market  Structure:  The  Case  of Bc'ivia',  in 0. Adams  et  al.
Underminina  Rural  Development  wth Cheap  Credit,  Westview  Press,  1984.
12  C. Cuevas,  'Transaction  Costs  of Borrowing  and  Credit  Rationing  in Developing  Countries,  ESOP  No.  1470,  The  Ohio
State  UniversIty,  1988.LI  '
CollectIOD  rates  cannot cover thelr oporating expenses wlth suchi  a low spread, as shown  by  the
example  of  the Malawi  Development  Flnance company,  which  collects over 97 percent of  loans
made,  but can only cover 17 to  20 percent of  operating costs. 13 Further, It has often  not
been taken fully  Into account that high rediscount margins (whereby  the central bank refinances
most of  the volume  of  subloans) allow financial Intermediaries  to overcome their liquldity problem
while being left  with the full credit risk.  In the face of  restricted  onlending  Interest  rates,
financlal Intermedlaries  resorted  to credit ratloning.  Hence,  fewer but larger loans were made  to
save on administrative  costs  and minimize  rlsk.  This caused concentration of  benefits among
larger farmers In spite of  the programs' equity objective. 14 Administratively fixed or Improperly
Indexed Interest  rates  caused massive  eroslon of  rural financial Institutlons'  equity In several
highly Inflationary economles,  which  In some  cases was temporarily  masked  by the Inflow of
external funds.  In Mexico,  for  example,  loans were deficiently Indexed,  so thelr nominal  value
Increased by only silghtly more than half the enormous  Inflatlon rate between 1980-87.  In Brazil,
Improper  Indexatlon resulted In a subsidy of  US  $5 billion within a six-month period In 1986.15
18.  Loan collectlon performance. Borrowers' Incentives to  repay loans are llmited  If it is
known that  no serious efforts  will be made  to  collect the dues and that  default will  not  affect
access to future  loans.  Government  leniency on delinquencies  has frequently  encouraged new
defaults.  These factors,  when  combined  with officlal  lenders' Inadequate Incentives to collect
13  Revlew  of Rural  Finances  Services  In Sub-Saharan  Africa', Agriculture  Division  of AfIdca  Technical  Department,  1989.
14 A. Braverman  and J,L.  Guasch,  'Rural Credit Reforms  In LDCs: Issues  and Evidence-,  in Joumal  of Economic
Development,  June 1989,  and PPR  Working  Paper  219.
15 OED,  Audit Report  on Agricutural  Credit  and Export  Development  Project Report  7922,  June 1989.loarn  repayiments, leci to  low recovery  ra{-l..i In mtlany  (  Icial c  >.  -,u,  u  ;A ii  [,  i ates
have usually varied between 50 and 6  percent, but sometimes  have even fallen below 20
percent.  In Bolivla, for  example,  delinquencles  were around 47 percent  In the  1970s.  Over 50
percent of  the loans made  through the cooperative system in Thailand  were In arrears In the
1980s.  Delinquency  rates of  50 percent were observed In Indla, 40 percent  In Malaysia  and
Nepal,  and about 80 percent In Bangladesh. 16
19.  Because  of  ineffIcient operations and low collection rates  of many government supported
lending  Institutlons,  officlal  agricultural credit programs  have often  been extremely costly  to
governments  and remained  without adequate developmental  Impact. For example,  the official  rural
financial system of  Mexico  has cost  the government over an extended Inflationary perlod more
than one dollar for  each dollar lent.  It Is not a coincidence that the rural credit systems of  the
World  Bank's three most importani agricultural credit borrowers, Brazil, Mexico,  and India, have all
experlenced severe problems  and placed enormous  burdens both directly on governmernt  budgets
and less directly on the external debt position.  The government  of  Brazil has at times allocated
about one-fourth  of  Its total agricultural expenditure to maintain  the agricultural credit system.
A major lesson cited by an OED  report  of  a credit project  In Brazil Is "the Inappropriateness of
subsidized credit as a tool  for  agrlcultural development."1 7 A Bank-sponsored study of  credit
16 Aslan  Productivity  Organization,  Farm  Credit Situathon  in Asia,  1984,  p. 47, and Asian  Productivity  Orgarizab'on,  Farm
Finance  and Agricultural  Development,  1988,  p. 250.
17  OED  Audit  Report  on Agricultwral  Credit  and Export  Development  Project,  Report  7992,  June 1989.14
Inpact Indlcates that the main  effect  was a substitutlon  of  purchased Inputs and machinery  for
labor, with a very modest change In output.18
20.  Successful credit programs.  Notable exceptions are the agricultural credit  systems In
South Korea and Taiwan,  where collection exceeds 90 percent.  These systems' high recovery
rates  have frequently  been ascribed to  strong  village cooperative systems and social
cohesiveness which have provided repayment Incentives and enforcement mechanisms.  Together
with a small  number  of  successful projects  In other parts of  the world, these systems have
shown  that  although agriculture Is subjected to  hlgher rlsks than other sectors,  satisfactory
repayment rates  can be achleved If the rlght Incentive and enforcement structure  exists.
2.  Arrangements  such as lending groups or credit cooperatives have the potentlal to  reduce
both the transaction costs  of  lending to small  farmers and the risks  Involved. Successful group
lending  programs have shown  the Importance  of  factors  such as homogeneous  borrowing groups
which are jointly liable and assums  themselves some  of  the managarlal  and supervisory
responsibilitles, a common  bond other than credit,  and denying access to  future  credit to the
whole group In case of  default by any member. important factors  for  success of  credit
cooperatives Include bottom-up Institutional development,  extensive tralning at all levels, reliance
on savings mobilization  and equity contribution rather  than external funds, slow expansion of
cooperative  activities and strict monitoring  and auditing. The  limited  success  observed vIth  such
18 H.  Bnswanger  et  al., Thw  Impact  of  Infrastructure  and Financial  InstituUons  on  Agricultural  Output  and  Investment  in India',
PPR  Working  Paper  no. 163,  March  1989.16
arrangements  to  date  Is mostly  due to  shortcomings  In their  hmplementation  and general
deficiencies  such  as low Interest  rates  rather  than  factors  Inherent  In their  desIgn.19
22.  In recent  years,  other  models of  successful  rural  finance  Institutions  have emerged. Their
success  may assist  us  In better  understanding  the  pollcies,  mode of  operatlons,  and Incentives
that  generated  significant  outreach  and financial  viability.  The Indoneslan  general  rural  credit
program was Introduced  In early  1984  by Bank Rakyat  Indonesia - Unit Desa (BUD) as a suppiy-
led institution.  Over a  relatively  short  perlod  of  time, from  1984 to  1989,  It  has become
extremely  successful  In mobilizing and servicing  deposits  and savings  and emerged as a well-
balanced  financial  institution.  BUD  has provided  depositing  and saving  services  to  a large number
of  cilents  and Its  saving  volume currently  signilicantly  exceeds  Its  outstanding  loan portfolo.
Effective  policies  and management practices  stand  behind BUD's success.  The major  polclies  have
been (I) applying high market  on-lending  Interest  rates  that  cover  the  overall  cost  of  operations,
(ii)  paying hlgh positive  Interest  rates  on  savings,  (111)  applying mobile banking  technlques  that
contributed  to  maintaWng administrative  costs  In check,  (lv)  applying significant  Incentives  to
borrowers  for  timely  repayment  In the  form of  Interest  rebates,  (v)  promoting  and paying
bonuses  to  staff  based on  branch  financial  performance,  (vi)  applying  simple,  clear  and efficient
methods of  loan  approval,  disbursements,  loan repayments  and saving  mobilization.  Clearly,
applying  these  policies  In a stable  economy, whereln inflation  was controlled  below  10% P.A., has
contributed  significantly  to  the  program's  success.  Over a period  of  a few  years,  and despite
the  high annual growth  rate  In outstanding  lan  portfollo,  BUD  became subsidy  Independent,  and
19M. Huppl  and  G. Feder,  The  Role  of Groups  and  Credit  Cooperaftves  In  Rural  Lending',  PPR  Working  Paper  no.  284,
Agrtulture  and  Rural  Development  Deparfnmntm  The  World  Bank,  1989.16
bImuitaneously  obtained  high return  on  Its  equity  over  the  recent  years.  The role  of  subsidized
financlal  resources  In the  Initial stage  of  the  BUD's operations  was nelther  cruclal  nor  necessary.
In retrospect,  one  may argue  that  BUD actually  needed  non-subsidized  financial  resources  to
resolve  a negative  cash-flow  problem In the  first  years  of  operatlons,  rather  than  concessional
fInancial  resources.2 1
23.  The  Bank  for Agriculture  and  Agriculture  Cooperatives  (BAAC)  In Thailand  was  estabilshed
In 1966 as a Government  owned  bank  to provide  financlal  assistance  to agricultural  producers.
Currently,  It provides  credit and  other financial  services to more  than half of the rural
populatlon. It gradually  has  made  progress  towards  subsidy  independence  by using  efficlent
modes  of operations  that resulted In very low  transactlon  costs.  Its overall  administrative  cost,
measured  against  Its total assets.  Is about 4 percent due to group londing  and the use of mobile
banking. It has achieved  a hlgh  loan  recovery In lending  to Individual  famers and  promoted  an
advanced  financial  reporting system. Recently,  the highost  growing  source of finance  has  been
voluntary savings,  thereby shifting Its initlal  characteristic  from supply-led  liistitutlon to a more
universal,  well-balanced  financial  institution, as well  as reducing  Its already  modest  subsidy
dependence.
24.  These  two institutions differ In many  ways  In their mode  of operations,  yet they both
have  progressed  significantly  In the right directlon  by (I) applying  market  oriented  onlnding and
deposit Interest rates, (ni)  emphasizing  saving  mobilization,  (111)  providing  staff  and clients with
20 J. Yaron,  *8ucossfA  Rurai  Fnanc Inution',  Word  Bank  Dicussaon  Pger, folhcominlg,  1992.17
slgnificant Incentive and bonus schemes,  (iv) applying efficient  mobile  banking systems, (v)
achleving  high ian  recovery, and (vi) making  use of  some sort  of  social mechanism  In officlont,
rapld screening and approving of  loans.  It should be underscored that  beside stable economles,
economic  policies enhancing  more 1iberailzed  financlal markets In the two countries contributed to
the two schemes  kinproved  performance.
Chapter 4:  The knpact of  the Bank's Recent Pollcy Paper
on Financial  Sector Operations on Future Agricultural Credit Lending
25.  The Bank's recent  policy paper on financial sector  operations considers directed credit
to  be a potentially useful tool  for  opening credit access to  activities or groups whose access
was impeded  by Inadequate Information or other market Imperfections. Although there were
exceptlons, It Is generally recognized that  directed credit programs  have often  been misused  with
negative consequence for  resource allocation, Income  distributlon, and macroeconomic
management.  Therefore, It Is recommended  that  financlal sector  strategias  as well as Bank
lending  operatlons that Involve directed credit be carefully analyzed and well justified  to ensure
that objectives  are adequately focused and achievable  and that  the programs  would not outlive
their usefulness.  Past experience has led the Bank to  look at the matter more cautiously and to
require an explicit justlifcation  before embarking  on directed credit schemes  or lending through
specialized  sector  credit institutions.  The conditions for  ensuring that  they would be engines of
growth and consistent  wlth officlent  financial sector  development  had to  be very carefully18
defined  and established.  The cholce,  however, of  whether the  Bank supports  sectoral
Institutions  or  universal  commercial banks  should be  ultimately  determined  by the  market;  there  Is
nothing  Inherently  wrong with a speclallzed  institutlon  If  It  Is competitive  and could  survive  In a
competitive  framework.  The criteria  bolng proposed  for  evaluating  the  financial  Intermediaries
therefore  be  uniformly  applied across  all Institutions.  This  inpiies pursuing  pe-Picipatlon  from
many  financial  Intermediaries  In agricultural  credit project Implementation,  rath,  .nan  malntenance
of  the  position  of  a natlonal  agricultural  Bank as an exclusive  Intermediary.
26.  The last  two  years  have witnessed  a major  re-evaluatlon  of  the  Bank's  approach,  wlth
much tighter  standards  on financial  sector  operations,  as  well as  lending through  financial
intermedlares.  This more restrictive  approach  has already  generated  a decline  In Bank
Agricultural  credit  lending through  financlal  Intermediaries  over  the  last  three  years.  In sum, the
current  Bank pollcy  does  not  exclude directed  credit  programs  per  se from  Bank support.  It
sImply subjects  them to  a more restrictive  burden  of  proof  test.  The extont  to  which the
current,  more restrictive  requirements  differ  from  past  performance  Is highiighted by the
ellgibillty  criteria  for  financial  Intermediaries'  participatlon  Is project  Implementatlon.  The Bank's
recent  draft  on  Operational  Directives  cn  Fhancial  Sector  Operations  reads:
"Participating  Fis should, at  a minmum, demonstrate  a  collectlon  rate,  which, given
Its  lending margin and applicable  tax rate,  and taking  Into  account  a reallstic
estImate  of  possible  portfolho  losses,  Inflation,  and the  opportunity  cost  of
capital,  avoids  the  eroslon  of  Its  capital."21
21 Page  20.  pam  65(c)19
CHAPTER  5:  LJPLICATIONS  FOR  FUTUR  AGRICTULRAL  CREDrT  LENDING
27.  Targetting  lending for  Agricultural Credit projects  may become warranted when It follows
significant changes that have occurred In the economy  and which  are expected to have substantlal
Impact  on the rural sector.  The recent  Bank Policy paper on financlal sector operations reads:22
"in  many developing countries,  poor  informatlon,  unfamillarity  with  modern financial
Instruments and Institutions,  lack of  lender experlence and expertise In evaluating certaln
activitles  or  new technologies, absence of  confidence between borrowers and lenders,
uncertalntles  regarding the permanence  of  economic  reforms, or  simply  traditlon  may limit
market response to  the opportunitles opened and demands  made  by financial sector  reform
and broader economic  adjustment. Properly designed  and  complemented  by necessary pollcy
reforms, targeted credit can act as a catelyst to overcomo  such obstacles, opening market
access  to  previously excluded groups and sectors,  such as  microenterprises and small
farmers, thereby promoting the development  of  credit markets."
It has to be, however,  substantiated that full reliance on market forces  Is not preferable, and that,
In the absence of  the proposed Intervention In the financlal market, the supply response or the
adoptlon of  now technologies  vWouId  be unacceptably slow.  In the circumstances outilned above,
agricultural credit projects  serving as a catalyst  In growth should be accompanied  by the removal
of  distorted  policies that  inhlbit demand  for  agriculture  Investments,  Introducing a  specific
targetted  line of  credit aimed  at speeding  up supply response can be a complementary  measure  to
the removal  of price controls on agricultural products which  hindered  market-Induced  lending  to the
rural sector.  Slmilarly,  directed credit can be useful when  the banking system Is considered to be
responding too  slowly to  other significant reforms such as changes In the terms of  trade of  the
agricultural sector due to trade llberalizatlon,  a sharp correctlon of an overstated rate of exchange
World  Bnk Polce Guidb  Finania Seco Ope0ton, Apri 1991,  page  9, paagrah 10.20
or removal  of other "urban bias" policios. Under  such circumstances,  Inadequate  Information on the
creditworthiness of  potentlal borrowers, lack of  confidence in the  sustalnability of  the changes
Introduced, and excessive rlsk aversion by lenders and borrowers can be mitigated by a directed
line of  credit.
28.  There may  be a Justificatlon for an agricultural credit line aimed  at speeding  up growth when
refoms  are Introduced to  remove bottlenecks  resulting from Inadequate land tenure system and
deficlent  contract  enforcement arrangements.  Likowls,  the  Introduction of  now and unfamillar
technologles characterizod by capital Intensity, may benefit  from a directed credit  at  the initil
stage.  It must be established however, that  an a priori Justificatlon for  Intervention In the credit
market, rather than alternative ones exists.  Possible  direct and Indirect negative impilcations  of the
Interventlons ought to  be fully  considered.  The evaluation of  the proposed Interventions should
verify that other problem*  afflicting agricuWture  are not assessed to signifIcantly diminish  the desired
effect  of  the Interventlon In the credit market.  When  subsidy Is granted, the overall subsidy cost
In  operatnig a program  of rural finance should  be made  transparent to ensure adequate assessment
of  the  desirability of  the  Intervention  In the  financlal market as  well as  the use  of  quantified
milestones  In progress to  be made  towards subsidy Lndependence.  The methodology  of  computing
the Subsldy Dependence  Index (SDI)23  of a rural finance institutlon  Is Instrumental In (I) placing the
total  amount of  subsudles recolved by  an institution  In the  context  of  Its  activity  level--the
Interest  eamed on Its  loan portfollo  (similar  to  calculations such as offective  protectlon  or job
J. Yamn,  Subidzd Deveopme  Fina  k*hIr_:  Is  ounent  s asament  of hIr financW  perbfrme adequa?'
AGR  Draft  pae,  Dem,ber,  1991.21
creatlon cost) and (ii) tracking progress made  by an Institution In reducing Its subsidy dependence
overtime.
29.  When  such an Interventlon In the fInancial market Is considered warranted, It Is essentlal to
ensure that the "Infant Industry" Is supported on a transitory  bails.  This would  avoid unwarranted
prolonging  of  the Intervention given that market forces  are assumed  to catch-up  and resolve the
transitory  Issue of  Inadequate allocatlon of  funds  to  priority  sectors/activities.  The "Infant
Industry" approach, by definition, conveys the message  that  an Intervention should eventually be
phased out.
30.  Given  the poor state of  affairs  In the agricultural credit systems of  many  cilent countrlos,
many  rural credit operatlons will  need to  be conditloned  on, and some  may  Include  as a component,
a  significant financial sector  reform.24 The reform may be speciflc to  agricultural credit,  or deal
more generally with the financlal system, depending  on the nature of problems  faced.  The aim  of the
reform would  be to ellminate  obstacles to the officlent  functloning of the rural credit market In the
broadest sense under compotitive conditions such as removal  of  monopoly  positlons In access to
government  rediscount facilitles, olimination  or tighter targeting of  subsidies, and deregulatlon of
Interest rates.
24 This  appills to credt programs in  all rgiom,  m fr  exampl, 'Review  of FNances  Services  in Sub-Saharan  Africa',
Agricultr Dihbn of Afrkc  Tecnnial  Deparment  1969;  and  'Latn  Ameia-  New  Ditons  for  Agrkultural  Credit  Projects  and
Ruwal  Fiaci  PolIcis, Trade,  Finance  ad  Industry  Division,  Latin  Anerica  Techncl Depa0nwit  1989.22
31.  The potentVal vlability of  existing speclalized agricultural credit  Institutlons  In a reformed
competitive onvironment  should be a conditlon of  thelr participation In Bank sponsored rural credit
operations,  In many Instances, a  signlficant  Institutlon  building component may be warranted,
Involving an overhaul of  the  Institutlon's  structure  and mode  of  operatlons  focus  on enhanced
efficiency akmed  at reducing transactlon costs  and knproving  loan collections.  Reliance  on savings
mobilizatlon, Instead  on  rediscounting  facilities  and  applying adequate  accounting,  auditing
procedures, and managerial  Informatlon systems at  e  ssentlal for  achieving viabillty.  Approprlate
staff  tralning and staff  and borrowers Incentives, emphasis  on strict  loan collectlon and Its proper
measurement  are key Ingredients of  viable Institutions.  The managerial  Informatlon system should
make  transparent the social cost of  state  support to the crodit Institution,  to allow public debate
on Its desirability,  is well as tracing changes In the subsidy dependence  over  time.
32.  The impressive  experience of  the rural credit system of Bank Rakyat Indonesia  - Unit Desa
(BUD)25  sugoests that, In contrast  to the frequent  failures of rural credit systems, a well designed
rural finance program  can be successful and  profitable.  In a relatively short period the BUD  program
became  subsidy Independent  and achloved  high  return on Its equity.  It Increased  Its assets annually
by more than real 30X over the perlod 1986-89, and applied  positive lending  and depositing Interest
rates.  BUD  succeoded to  rely  on saving mobilizatlon  as Its  main  growth factor,  reaching saving
amounts  that significantly exceeded  Its loan portfollo by the end of  1990.  This  suggests that there
was a tremendous  demand  for saving services In the rural areas which  allowed  BUD  to become,  after
a very short  period, Independent  from donor funds.  Loans were granted to all Income-gonerating
25 J,  Yaron,  Succesful  Rual  Finance  insions'  The  World  Bank,  Diussion  Paper,  fortfcoming  1992.23
activitles  and were not  limited to  agriculture,  thereby  achieving a more balanced lender  risk
distributlon.
33.  Where  smaliholdere'  access to credit Is a valId  concern within  a Bank  credit operation, proJect
design should make as much  use as possible of  self-help  groups and other grassroots  voluntary
organizations which  allow the reductlon of  transactlon costs and lenjing risks.  However,  given the
lessons learned about the prerequisites for successful outcomes  with such arrangements,  attention
must be paid to  the likely effectiveness  of  existing organizatlons.  Cautlon  must also be exercised
so as not to make  the existence of local organizations overly dependent  on external funds, lest this
change thelr  character  and cause thelr  demise.  This, however, implies  a limited ability of  such
organizatlons to absorb largo  volumes  of  external funds.
34.  Preferred Mode  of  Assistance to  the RFI. State or donor financial support, In the form of
making  financlal resources avallab!e  (not necessarily at a subsidized  Interest  rate), can constitute
an Important contributlon to a newly established Rural Finance Program  durlng the Initial, negative
cashf  low stage of  the RFi's  development. Savings  mobilization  should  not become  the minor  residual
balance - as  has often  happened wlth supply-led credit  institutlons  - that  constitutes  the
difference  between  the loan portfolio and concesslonal  borrowed funds.  On  the contrary, state or
donor lending to  the RFI  should only assist In temporarily closing the gap between an RFi's fully
motivated savings mobilizatlon  and Its bankable  loan portfolio.  BUD's  successful exporlenco  clearly
supports this notion.  This implies  that state or donor support could generally be used for a shorter
perlod of  tine  when compared wlth past  practice  of  cooperatlon  between supply-led  fInanclal24
institutional  and do,tors.  Obviously, the servicing of  new clients, opening of  now branches, and
renderlng services to an Increased  share of the rural populatlon, are factors whIch  define the length
of  the  period In which the  financial support  to  the  RFI  may be useful.  The Indonesian  example
Indlcates that making  funds available  was kIportant to the program's rajoid  growth during Its Initial
stage of  development.  However, no subsidy In the form of  concessional borrowed funds was
necessary for  Its growth, as is demonstrated  by Its full 1989 subsidy Independence. The Issue  that
donor support had to resolve during BUD's  Initial stage of operations was the avallabillty of funds,
not subsidizing their cost.
35.  Institution  Building.  State or  donor support  to  an RFI  should concentrate  on Institution
building and developing to  become a viable rural  finance institution.  Targetted  credit  witlout
adequate component  of  institution  bullding Is almost always a guaranteed recelpe for  prolonged
future  dependence  on donor or state funds and b4il-outs.  The more notlon that  It Is consldered
socially desirable to  Intervene In the financial market and to use scares resources  for  achieving
specific objectives hkples, In  most Instances, a need for  Institutional bulding so as to ensure that
the financial Institution Involved Is on Its way to becoming  mature, autonomous,  and officient.  Care
taken In institutlon  building Is often  the  prlne difference  between an RFI  that  could eventually
become  seif-sustalning  after  a few years of  support granted during Its start  up period and an RFI
that would need permanent  subsidles and ball-outs.  The iack of  adequate e. phasis on Institutlon
building  In RFls  Is a common  characterltic  of supply-bd  credit institutions.  Too few resources are
devoted to guarantoolng adequate  tralning, officlent and  meaningful  managerial  information  systems,26
staff  Incentive systems, promotlon of  saving mobilization  and the like, all of  which  are cruclal to an
AFI  becoming  an Independent,  well-balatced, and Increasingly self-sustainable  Institution.
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